Critical Infrastructure

Control access to operational technology and industrial control systems while keeping people responsible for high-impact actions.

Industry starter · Sovereign region

What it checks

Policies in the Critical Infrastructure template, in the order the gateway runs them
PolicyOnChecksAction
prompt-injectionRequest4 attack patterns; similarity threshold 0.87Block
rbacRequestRequires the X-User-ID, X-Org-ID, X-Sector-Role and X-Facility-ID headersBlock
pii-detectorRequest7 custom identifier patternsRedact
dlp-filterRequest9 blocked terms such as “SCADA configuration” and “OT network diagram”; 8 custom patterns; near-miss spellingsBlock
agent-firewallBothAllows 3 tools; denies 8 tools; at most 2 actions per sessionBlock
safety-filterRequestBuilt-in critical infrastructure patterns; 9 extra blocked phrases such as “disable emergency shutdown” and “override safety interlock”; near-miss spellingsBlock
bot-detectorRequestMore than 6 similar requests in 300 seconds; similarity ≥ 0.90Block
code-sanitizerBoth8 extra code patternsBlock
quality-scorerResponseAccuracy ≥ 0.95; relevancy ≥ 0.93; combined score ≥ 0.94; at least 250 characters and 3 sentences; critical-infrastructure profileBlock
audit-loggerRequestAdds an allow-only audit marker to the decisionRecord
Policy YAML
pack:
  id: "cfg_demo_critical_infrastructure"
  name: "demo-critical-infrastructure"
  version: "0.2.0"
  enabled: true
  author: "local"
  description: "Critical infrastructure template for OT-safe AI assistance with restricted agent actions and operational data controls"
distributed_rate_limit:
  backend: valkey
  url_env: VERDICTAN_REDIS_URL
history:
  capture:
    enabled: true
    mode: redacted
    include_blocked: true
    fail_open: false
policies:
  chain: ["prompt-injection", "rbac", "pii-detector", "dlp-filter", "agent-firewall", "safety-filter", "bot-detector", "code-sanitizer", "quality-scorer", "audit-logger"]

policy:
  prompt-injection:
    embedding_threshold: 0.87
    attack_patterns: ["ignore.*operating.*limits", "disable.*safety.*interlock", "reveal.*network.*topology", "bypass.*operator.*approval"]
    response: { action: block, message: "Prompt rejected by critical infrastructure safety controls.", log_level: warn }
  # Sector operators must identify user, owning organization, role, and facility before any action support is given.
  rbac:
    deny_if_missing: ["X-User-ID", "X-Org-ID", "X-Sector-Role", "X-Facility-ID"]
  pii-detector:
    detect_patterns: ["(?i)(?:operator|badge)\\s*(?:id|#|number)\\s*[:#-]?\\s*[A-Z0-9-]{4,16}", "(?i)\\bvendor\\s+contact\\s*[:#-]?\\s*[A-Za-z0-9 ,()+-]{6,80}", "(?i)(?:shift|crew|duty)\\s+roster\\b", "(?i)(?:maintenance|hotline|on[-\\s]?call)\\s*(?:phone|line|#)?\\s*[:#-]?\\s*(?:\\+?\\d[\\d\\s().-]{7,}\\d)", "(?i)(?:access|proximity|badge)\\s*card\\s*(?:#|number|no\\.)?\\s*[:#-]?\\s*[A-Z0-9-]{4,20}", "(?i)\\bservice\\s+account\\s*[:#=]?\\s*[A-Za-z0-9_.@-]{3,64}", "(?i)\\bincident\\s+reporter\\s*[:#-]?\\s*[A-Za-z ,'-]{3,80}"]
    action: redact
    redaction: { marker_format: label, include_metadata: true, preserve_length: false }
  # NIST SP 800-82 / NERC CIP / ICS hardening: block OT topology, SCADA config, and blueprint leakage.
  dlp-filter:
    blocked_terms: ["SCADA configuration", "OT network diagram", "facility blueprint", "PLC ladder logic", "relay setting file", "substation one-line", "HMI admin password", "historian connection string", "safety instrumented system"]
    detect_patterns: ["ModbusTcpClient", "opc\\.tcp://", "(?i)\\bdnp3\\b", "(?i)\\bwrite_coil\\s*\\(", "(?i)\\bwrite_register\\s*\\(", "(?i)\\bengineering\\s+workstation\\b", "(?i)\\bvalve\\s+position\\s+setpoint\\b", "(?i)\\bbreaker\\s+trip\\s+command\\b"]
    action: block
    fuzzy_matching: true
    max_distance: 1
    sensitivity_level: restricted
  # Only non-actuating support tools are allowed; anything capable of direct control or scanning is blocked.
  agent-firewall:
    allowed_tools: ["runbook_search", "ticket_create", "status_check"]
    blocked_tools: ["shell", "network_scan", "file_upload_external", "web_request", "ssh_exec", "plc_write", "relay_trip", "valve_control"]
    max_actions_per_session: 2
  safety-filter:
    mode: critical_infrastructure
    block_if: ["disable emergency shutdown", "override safety interlock", "bypass protection relay", "force valve open without permit", "disable alarm annunciation", "skip lockout tagout", "ignore pressure trip", "shed load without dispatcher approval", "disable chlorine feed safeguard"]
    action: block
    fuzzy_matching: true
    max_distance: 1
  # Detect repeated probing and scripted abuse against OT-support AI surfaces.
  bot-detector:
    fingerprint_fields: ["user-agent", "x-forwarded-for", "authorization", "body"]
    profile_window_seconds: 300
    similarity_threshold: 0.90
    max_requests_per_window: 6
    action: block
  # Block ICS/SCADA code or commands that could enable direct actuation or unsafe reconfiguration.
  code-sanitizer:
    enabled: true
    block_on_match: true
    additional_patterns: ["ModbusTcpClient", "write_coil\\(", "write_register\\(", "S7Client\\.ConnectTo", "opc\\.tcp://", "dnp3", "systemctl\\s+stop", "relay_trip_command"]
  quality-scorer:
    industry: critical-infrastructure
    min_output_chars: 250
    min_sentences: 3
    benchmarks: { ragas_faithfulness: true, ragas_relevancy: true, coherence: true, completeness: true }
    thresholds: { min_aggregate: 0.94, min_faithfulness: 0.95, min_relevancy: 0.93, min_coherence: 0.92, min_completeness: 0.92, min_accuracy: 0.95 }
    failure_action: { action: block, fallback_message: "Response withheld pending operator review." }
  audit-logger: {}